Seminario del Dpto. de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la ciencia (UNED)

MARTES 17 DE MAYO, 12.00 (Sala 06 de Filosofía, UNED)

Anjan Chakravartty (Notre Dame)"A Trilemma for Scientific Perspectivism"
Is scientific knowledge irreducibly perspectival? Kantian and thoroughgoing conventionalist views, which take such knowledge to be irreducibly reflective of human ways of knowing and view all aspects of it in terms of human conventions, respectively, are obvious forms of perspectivism. Additionally, some scientific realists, who (unlike Kantians and thoroughgoing conventionalists) hold that we have substantive knowledge of a mind-independent world, also argue that scientific knowledge is inescapably perspectival. The common use of incompatible scientific models of one and the same phenomenon is cited as exemplary. I argue that to the extent that we can make sense of this combination of perspectivism and realism, it is trivial, and to the extent that we cannot, it is either unstable or incoherent. This amounts to a trilemma for scientific perspectivism. As an alternative, I explore some options for what a realist could say instead.